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A median voter model is developed to explain the size of the vertical fiscal gap in a federation, 
i.e. the extent to which subnational governments’ expenditures exceed their own-source tax 
revenues.  In our model, individuals vote in subnational elections and in federal elections to 
determine tax rates and spending on public services by each level of government and transfers 
to the subnational governments. In the resulting political equilibrium, intergovernmental 
transfers from the central government are affected by the tax sensitivity of the tax bases of the 
central and subnational governments, the degree of inequality in the tax bases of the 
subnational governments, the allocation of spending responsibilities between the central and 
subnational governments, and whether the federal legislature is unicameral or bicameral. 
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1.0  Introduction 
Intergovernmental grants are an important part of the fiscal architecture of most federations, 
but the degree to which subnational governments rely on grants from central governments 
varies widely across federations.  See Table 1.  For example, the Australian state governments 
are three times as reliant on intergovernmental transfers as the Canadian provinces.  What 
accounts for this difference in reliance on intergovernmental transfers between two countries 
which, in other respects such as colonial history, legal systems, and economic structures, are 
very similar?   
Questions concerning the level and pattern of intergovernmental transfers has lead to 
the development of a number of theoretical political economy models, including Pereira 
(1996), Dixit and Londregan (1998), Crémer and Palfrey (2000), Snoddon and Wen (2003), 
and Volden (2007).  There is also a growing body of empirical research on the determinants of 
intergovernmental transfers in a number of different countries—Bennett and Mayberry (1979), 
Grossman (1994), Borck and Owings (2003), and Gamkhar and Ali (2007) for the United 
States; Alperovich (1984) for Israel; Pereira (1996) and Veiga and Pinho (2007) for Portugal; 
Bungey, Grossman, and Kenyon (1991) and Worthington and Dollery (1998) for Australia; 
Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) for Argentina; and Feld and Schaltegger (2005) for 
Switzerland—and empirical studies on the variation in the fiscal gaps among countries.  See, 
for example, Rodden and Wibbels (2002) and Bird and Tarasov (2004).   
In this paper, we develop a median voter model to explain the size of the vertical fiscal 
gap in a federation, which we define as the ratio of transfers received by to subnational 
governments to their expenditures.
1  In our model, individuals vote in subnational elections to 
                                                 
1 Note that we distinguish between the notion of a vertical fiscal gap—the difference between a subnational 
government’s expenditures and its own source tax revenues—and the notion of a vertical fiscal imbalance, which 
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determine subnational governments’ spending on a public service and a proportional income 
tax rate, and they vote in federal elections which determine spending on a federal public 
services, the federal tax rate on income, and the federal transfers to subnational governments.  
Specifically, we try to address the following questions: 
•  How does the allocation of spending powers and the tax assignment affect the size of the 
fiscal gap? 
•  Does income inequality, between regions and within regions, affect the size of the fiscal 
gap? 
•  When does a fiscal gap improve or distort the allocation of resources in an economy? 
•  Who gains and who loses from federal transfers to subnational governments? 
•  Do intergovernmental transfers promote national unity or do they exacerbate regional 
tensions? 
•  Does the size of the fiscal gap depend on whether the federal legislature is unicameral or 
bicameral? 
•  Does the magnitude of stimulative effect of transfers on a subnational government’s 
spending influence the level of transfers? 
•  Why do the representatives of rich subnational governments support at least some level of 
intergovernmental transfers from the central government? 
Our model can also be viewed as an extension of the Meltzer and Richard (1981) model 
to a federation, and we use it to investigate the question of vertical fiscal imbalance.  It is also 
based on earlier models by Usher (1977), Bos (1979), and Wilson (1985) who showed that 
                                                                                                                                                          
we define as a misallocation in spending and taxation between the levels of government.  See Dahlby (2005 and 
2008) and Boadway and Tremblay (2006) on the distinction between vertical fiscal gaps and vertical fiscal 
imbalances. 
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there may be a greater demand for a public service at the federal level than at the provincial 
level if the national income distribution is more skewed to the right than the provincial income 
distribution.  In these models, the “tax price” that the median voter pays for a government 
service is determined, in part, by the ratio of the median income to the average income in that 
jurisdiction.  In other words, the ratio of the median to the mean income indicates how much an 
individual with the median income has to pay for a dollar of government spending, assuming 
that the revenue is collected from a non-distortionary proportional income tax.  The lower this 
ratio, the lower the effective price paid by the median voter for public services and the higher 
the level of services that will be provided by the government.  From these insights it possible to 
infer that voters will tend to support increased block grants from the federal government to the 
subnational governments if voters see a lower tax price for public services financed by the 
federal government rather than the subnational government.  This paper attempts to provide a 
rigorous foundation for this hypothesis.   
Our paper also contributes to literature on determinants of intergovernmental transfers 
by explicitly modeling citizens’ incentives to support intergovernmental grants.  Other 
theoretical models in this literature, such as Snoddon and Wen (2003) and Volden (2007), 
assume that central and subnational governments’ have preferences which motivate their 
decisions concerning the level of intergovernmental grants, but they do not show how these 
preferences reflect the interests of voters in the different subnational governments in a 
federation.  Another difference is that our paper is concerned with the aggregate fiscal gap in a 
federation, whereas other models are mainly concerned with how grants vary between different 
subnational governments in the same federation.  To the best of our knowledge, no one has 
attempted to develop a theoretical framework to examine the factors that affect the size of the 
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vertical fiscal gap in a federation over time or between countries.  We hope that our paper will 
provide a framework for future empirical research on this topic. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.0 describes the median voter model when 
the federal government’s legislature is unicameral.  The median voter’s preferences in the 
subnational government’s elections determine its tax rate and expenditure level on subnational 
government public services.  We also derive an expression for the impact of increases in 
federal transfers on the subnational government’s spending.  The level of intergovernmental 
grants, along with spending on federally-provided public services and federal tax rates are 
determined in the federal elections, and we derive conditions which describe the desired 
federal fiscal variables for a voter with a given income level in a given subnational jurisdiction.  
We then describe the determination of the median desired tax rates, expenditure level, and 
transfers.  The resulting political equilibrium is quite complex, and therefore in Section 3.0 we 
compute the equilibrium for parameter values that roughly reflect some of the key variables in 
Canada.  We use computations based on the model to illustrate how the size of the vertical 
fiscal gap is affected by the tax sensitivity of the tax bases of the central and subnational 
governments, the degree of inequality in the tax bases of the subnational governments, and the 
allocation of spending responsibilities between the central and subnational governments.  In 
Section 4.0, we consider how the level of intergovernmental grants would be affect by different 
institutional structures.  Specifically, we consider how the level of transfers would be 
determined in a bicameral federal legislature where one body, the House, is elected on the basis 
of population and the other elected body, the Senate, gives equal representation to each 
subnational governments.  In Section 5.0, we use our framework in discussing the underlying 
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reasons for the differences in the vertical fiscal gaps in Australia and Canada.  The final section 
contains a summary of our conclusions with regard to the questions posed above. 
 
2.0  A Median Voter Model with a Unicameral Federal Legislature 
We consider a very simple version of the Meltzer and Richard (1981) median voter model 
applied to a federation.  There are two levels of government.  At the federal level, elections are 
based on a national vote.  Initially, it will be assumed that the federal legislature is unicameral 
and based on representation by population.  We will call this legislature the House. There are n 
subnational governments, which we will call provincial governments, and the election of a 
unicameral provincial legislature is based on majority voting within each province.  It is 
assumed that in the provincial election, voters take the federal expenditure level, the federal tax 
rate, and transfers to the provinces as given.   
The utility function of individual h in province i is: 
Uhi  =  (1 - ti - t0)yh  +  P(gi)  +  F(g0)            ( 1 )  
where ti is a proportional tax rate levied by province i on individual h’s income, yh, to finance 
its expenditures on the provincial public service, gi.  The federal government’s tax rate is t0 and 
the expenditure on the public service provided by the federal government is g0.  To keep the 
model simple, we assume that preferences for provincial and federal public services are the 
same for all individuals in all provinces and that  0 F , 0 F , 0 P , 0 P < ′ ′ > ′ < ′ ′ > ′ .  The mean income 
in province i is yai, the median income is ymi, and the distribution function of income is Hi(y). 
Let pi be the population of province i and p .  The national population is 
normalized to equal one and the population shares of the provinces are fixed, i.e. there is no 
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2.1  Provincial Fiscal Decisions 
A provincial government finances its expenditures with its proportional income tax and from 
its transfer from the federal government.  Province i’s budget constraint, expressed in per 
capita terms, is equal to: 
i 0 ai i g T y t = +             ( 2 )  
where T0 is the per capita lump-sum grant that each province receives from the federal 
government.  The per capita intergovernmental grant is the same for all provinces.
2  In most of 
our discussion, it will be assumed that intergovernmental transfers flow from the federal 
government to the province, i.e. T0 ≥ 0.  However, we also consider the possibility later in this 
section that grants could flow from the provinces to the central government.  Given the level of 
federal transfers and federal public services and the federal tax rate, the optimal gi (and the 














= ′            ( 3 )  
where  is the marginal benefit that an individual receives from gi.  Our assumption that 
the marginal utility of income is constant (and equal to one) and that the utility function is 
additively separable implies that the marginal benefit from any given level of the provincial 
) g ( P i ′
                                                 
2Examples of these types of intergovernmental grants are the Canadian Social Transfer (CST) and the Canada 
Health Transfer (CHT).  In 2007-08 the CST became an equal per capita grant of $289 and the CHT is scheduled 
to become an equal per grant in 2014-15.  See Government of Canada (2007, pp.335-336).  These two transfer 
program represent approximately three-quarters of the total federal transfers to the Canadian provinces.  Although 
these transfers are nominally linked to provincial spending on education, social welfare programs, and health care, 
the provinces have considerable leeway in deciding how the funds will be used.  In this paper we are not 
concerned with the other major transfer program in Canada, equalization payments, which are directed to 
provinces with low fiscal capacity. 
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public service is the same for all individuals, i.e. the marginal benefit does not vary with 
income.  This is obviously a highly restrictive assumption, but helps to simplify the analysis.  


















=          ( 4 )  
where   measures the sensitivity of average income, the provincial 
government’s tax base, to an increase in the province’s tax rate.  Although we do not specify 
the process, it is assumed that higher tax rates can lead to a reduction in average income 
because of disincentive effects to earn income.  It is assumed that the provincial government is 
operating on the upward-sloping section of its Laffer curve, and therefore the elasticity of the 
province’s tax revenues with respect to its tax rate, 1 + tiηi, is positive. 
0 dt / ) y ln( d i ai i ≤ = η
The right-hand side of (3) represents the tax price for provincial public services, TPih, 
faced by individual h in province i because it measures the cost to individual h of an additional 
dollar spent on provincial services and financed through a provincial tax increase.  The tax 
price of provincial public services is the product of two factors—a redistributive factor (yh/yai) 
and a tax distortion factor, the MCFi.  The redistributive factor arises because, in the absence 
of tax distortions, the increase in per capita revenues from a tax rate increase is proportional to 
the average income in the province while the increase in an individual’s tax burden is in 
proportion to his income.  The redistributive effect can make the effective tax price of a dollar 
of provincial spending less than a dollar for an individual whose income is less than the 
average income.  The tax distortion effect, which is measured by the province’s marginal cost 
of public funds, implies that the effective tax price for public services can exceed a dollar if tax 
rates cause the tax base to shrink because of tax avoidance or tax evasion. 
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If preferences for gi are “single-peaked”, the decisive voter in a two-party election will 
be the one who displays the median demand for gi.  Since the marginal benefit of the provincial 
public service is the same for all individuals, the “median voter” will be the individual with the 
median income, ymi, in province i because he pays the median tax price.  Therefore, the 
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= ′           ( 5 )  
In most societies, the income distribution is skewed to the right, the median income is less than 
the mean income, and therefore ymi/yai < 1. One implication of this is that an increase in 
income inequality, as measured by a reduction in the ymi/yai ratio, would lead to an increase in 
the provision of the public service, because the median voter would bear a lower proportion of 
the total cost of providing an additional unit of gi.
3   
We need to consider how an increase in federal transfers affects the expenditure on the 
provincial public service.  Taking the total differential of (2) and (5), the effect of an increase 
in federal transfers on a provincial government’s expenditures is given by: 
() () 2














































= γ ≡      ( 6 a )  
where 0 < γi < 1 if ηi < 0.  If the provincial public service were financed by a non-distortionary 
tax, such that ηi = 0, then dgi/dT0 = 0.  Ceteris paribus the stimulate effect of a federal transfer 
will be larger if the provincial tax rate or the tax sensitivity of its tax base is higher, if average 
provincial income is lower, or if marginal benefit from the provincial public service declines 
                                                 
3 See Rodriguez (1999) and Harms and Zink (2003) for assessments of the predictive power of the median model 
with regard to redistribution. 
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relatively slowly with as service levels increase. Note that because γi is less than one, an 
increase in federal transfers also leads to a reduction in the provincial tax rate.  Differentiating 















y 1 + + = γ           ( 6 b )  
or: 










=            ( 7 )  
It is also worth pointing out that the stimulative effect of an increase in federal transfers 
is different from an equivalent equal per capita increase in the incomes of the residents of the 
subnational government.
 4  Again, taking the total differential of (2) and (5) and setting dymi = 










y P t 1 y
P 1 t 1 y
dy
dg
η + ′ ′ η +
′ − η +
=          ( 8 )  
Note that  0 dy dg i i <
>  as  1 P <
> ′ .  In other words, an equal per capita increase in the residents’ 
incomes would increase (decrease) provision of the public good if the marginal benefit from 
the provincial public good is greater than (less than) one.  The reason why higher personal 
incomes have an ambiguous effect on the provision of services in this model is that an equal 
per capita increase in incomes has two offsetting effects of the effective price of public 
services.  It would increase the redistributive factor (ymi/yai), thereby increasing the effective 
price of public services for the median voter, and it would reduce the tax distortion factor, 
                                                 
4Our model is capable of generating a “flypaper effect”, i.e. the stimulative effect of a transfer on a recipient 
government’s spending can be substantially larger than an equivalent increase in its per capita income.  See 
Hamilton (1986), Becker and Mulligan (2003), Volden (2007) and Dahlby (2008b) on the flypaper effect arising 
from subnational governments’ use of distortionary taxation to finance their expenditures.  For an alternative 
political economy model of the flypaper effect, see Roemer and Silvestre (2002). 
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because with a higher yai, the same level of service can be provide at a lower ti, and therefore 
the MCFi will be lower.  If initially  1 P < ′  because the redistributive factor outweighs the tax 
distortion factor, then an equal per capita increase in incomes will increase the effective price 
of the public service to the median voter, and he would vote for a lower level of public 
services.  In our model, the marginal benefit for the public service is independent of income.  If 
the marginal benefit or willingness to pay for the public service increased with income, then an 
increase in per capita incomes would have a greater stimulative effect on spending on the 
public service. 
 
2.2  Federal Fiscal Decisions with a Unicameral Legislature 
  We will now consider the fiscal decisions made at the federal level based on a national 
election to a unicameral house of representatives.  National variables are denoted by a subscript 
0, and the federal government’s per capita budget constraint is: 
0 0 0 a 0 T g y t + =            ( 9 )  
where ya0 is the national average income defined by  .  The desired levels of g0, t0 
and T0 for individual h in province i will be determined by the federal budget constraint in (9) 
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where equation (10) is the federal counterpart to the condition for the optimal provision of the 
provincial public service and (1 + t0η0)
-1 is the federal government’s marginal cost of public 
funds.  It will also be assumed that 1 + t0η0 > 0 and that  0 0 i < η ≤ η .  That is, the federal 
income tax base is generally less tax sensitive than any province’s tax base, perhaps because it 
is harder to evade or avoid taxes at the national level than at the provincial level. 
Equation (11) determines the optimal transfer from the perspective of individual h in 
province i.  The left-hand side is the perceived marginal benefit from increasing the federal 
transfer to the provincial governments, which takes the form of a tax cut and an increase in 
expenditure on the public good.  Note that the benefit of a marginal increase in a transfer will 
tend to be higher for a low income individual if the expenditure stimulation effect, γi, is larger 
because a low income individual gets relatively little benefit from a tax cut and by assumption, 
all individuals get the same marginal benefit from an increase in the provincial public service.  
The right-hand side is the individual’s tax price for federal public services, which represents 
the opportunity cost of increasing federal transfers.  Note that voters with the same income, but 
residing in different provinces, will generally prefer different levels of intergovernmental 
transfers because the level of provincial public services will in general vary across provinces 
and therefore the marginal benefit from an increase in provincial services will be different in 
different provinces.
5  In addition, the allocation of an increase in transfers between a spending 
increase and a tax cut will also vary across provinces. 
                                                 
5 In our model individuals vote for federal grants to fund provincial government spending because the perceived 
tax price of a federal transfers is lower than their provincial government’s tax revenue and not out of a desire to 
promote “national standards”.  See Telford (2003) on the demand for national standards in the Canadian debates 
about the level of intergovernmental transfers.  Our model predicts that the percentage of the population who 
demand higher federal grants to promote national standards in provincial social programs would be higher in 
provinces with lower average incomes, i.e. individuals use the rhetoric of national standards to promote their self 
interest. 
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Assuming individual h is sophisticated and recognizes that the combination of tax cut 
and expenditure increase in his province will be determined according to the preferences of the 
median voter in his province, then using (6a) and (7) the desired federal tax rate from the 
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t         ( 1 2 a )  
Equation (12a) together with (9) and (10) determine the optimal federal transfers to the 
provinces from the perspective of individual h in province i.  Note that if individual h had zero 
income, he would like the federal tax rate to be set at the revenue-maximizing tax rate of -1/η0, 
and this revenue would be spent on the federal public service and transfers to the provinces.  
All individuals in province i with incomes in excess of ymini would want a federal tax rate of 
zero where ymini
  is defined by: 
() 0 a i i i ai
mi i ao
i y ) 1 ( t 1 y
y y
min y
γ − − η +
γ
=          ( 1 3 )  
Equation (12a) indicates that individuals who live in provinces with lower average incomes 
will desire higher federal taxes to finance higher transfers to the provinces because the tax 
price of federal revenue is low compared to their provincial tax price.  Individuals who live in 
provinces where the provincial MCF is high will also favour higher federal taxes.  In general, 
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=          ( 1 4 )  
                                                 
6 Since the federal tax rate is bounded between 0 and 1, all individuals with incomes below some critical value 
yhmax would want the revenue maximizing tax rate or a 100 percent tax rate and those with an income in excess of 
yhmin would want a federal tax rate of zero.  Inside these bounds, the optimal federal tax rate decreases with the 
individual’s income. 
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Although the assumption of rational behaviour on the part of voters is a compelling 
one, it is also useful to consider two alternative assumptions about voters’ expectations.  First, 
suppose that voters naively assume that a marginal transfer will be used to cut provincial taxes, 






















− =           (12b) 
Note that if all of the voters were naïve tax-cutters, then all of the voters in province i would 
support the same federal tax rate, i.e. the optimal federal tax rate for voters in province i would 
be independent of the individuals’ income.  An interesting feature of this case is that there will 
be unanimity among the residents of a province regarding the optimal level of federal transfers, 
even though the residents of the province may have vastly different incomes, face very 
different tax prices for provincial public services, and desire different levels of provincial 
public services.  Individual in provinces with lower average incomes would want higher 
federal tax rates.  The residents of provinces where the elasticity of provincial tax revenue with 
respect to the provincial tax rate is lower (or in other words where the provincial MCF is 
higher) would also want higher federal tax rates and higher transfers.   
  Alternatively, if all voters believed that marginal federal transfers would be spent on 

































− =          ( 1 2 c )  
If this case, the optimal federal tax rate is also higher for individuals with lower incomes and 
higher for individuals who live in poorer provinces. 
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  The median voter model predicts that a successful political party in a federal election 
will offer to levy the median desired level of federal taxation,  .  This is the rate of federal 
taxation that would be desired by an individual with income of   in province i based on (12a) 










i i i = ∑
=
           ( 1 5 )  
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the median voter equilibrium for the case where there are three 
provinces with   and  3 a 2 a 1 a y y y < < 1 0 − < η .  In this example, an individual in the province 1 is 
wants a higher federal tax rate than an individual with the same income in province 3 because 
the average national income is higher than the average provincial income in the province 1 and 
therefore the tax price of federal services tends to be lower than the tax price of provincial 
services in province 1.  Individuals in province 3 at any given income level desire lower federal 
tax rates than individuals in the other provinces because the tax price of federal services is 
higher compared to the tax price of provincial services because they live in a high average 
income province.  The median desired rate of federal taxation is a rate that is desired by a 
relatively high income individual in province 1 and a relatively low income individual in 
province 3. 
The median desired tax rate is determined by (15) and (12a).  The question remains 
how federal tax revenues are split between g0 and T0.  We have (somewhat arbitrarily) assumed 
that g0 is determined by the voter with the median national income because his preferred level 
of spending on g0 will be the median desired level of level of federal services given the federal 
tax rate t0.  With this level of federal program spending and the federal tax rate, the level of 
transfers to the provinces will be determined as a residual by the federal budget constraint. 
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The median desired federal tax rate portrayed in Figure 1 and defined by (15) is part of 
a general political equilibrium.  The positions of the desired federal tax rate curves in Figure 1 
depend on the tis, both directly and through their effects on the yais, the γis, and the ya0, which 
in turn depend on the equilibrium t0 through its effect on the level of transfers.  The general 
equilibrium properties of the model are complex, and we have relied on the numerical 
simulations described in the following section to develop some intuition about the properties of 
the equilibrium.   
  However, before considering the simulation results, we can derive some insights 
concerning the properties of the model and the direction of the transfers by assuming that the 
utility functions for provincial and federal public services have the following specific forms: 
) g ln( ) g ( P i i ρ =            ( 1 6 )  
) g ( ln ) g ( F 0 0 φ =            ( 1 7 )  
where ρ and  are positive parameters which represent the strength of the preference for 
provincial and federal public services.  With   in (10) and using the federal budget 
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T ]           ( 1 8 )  
Note that federal transfers will be positive, i.e. funds will flow from the central government to 
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In other words, for transfers flow from the central government to the provinces the equilibrium 
federal tax rate has to exceed a critical value given by the right-hand side of the second 
inequality.  This condition indicates that the critical value will be larger the greater the value 
that citizens place on federal services, the greater the tax sensitivity of the federal tax base or 
the lower the median income in the federation.  If the   is less than this critical value, then 
transfers will flow from the provincial governments to the federal government. 
v
0 t
In almost all federations, funds flow from the federal government to the provinces, and 
therefore we would expect the equilibrium federal tax rate usually exceeds the critical value.  
However, in China up until the mid-1990s, the central government received transfers from the 
subnational government.  Whether the Chinese example is consistent with the prediction of the 
model is debatable because China is obviously not a democracy.  Still, the conditions in China 
at the time—low median income, limited ability of the central government to raise tax 
revenues, and (more subjectively) a high value for the services provided by the central 
government may have provided the conditions under which transfers to the central government 
from the subnational government in China were in the interest of the median Chinese “voter”.  
Of course, all of this is highly speculative, and in the numerical examples contained in the next 
section, transfers always flow from the central government to the provincial governments. 
 
3.0  Simulation of the Political Equilibrium with Unicameral Federal Legislature 
  To illustrate the properties of our model, we have constructed a simple simulation 
model.  We model a federation with three provinces where the population shares and relative 
average family incomes are similar to those in Ontario, Alberta/British Columbia, and the other 
seven provinces.  In this set up, Ontario (ONT) is province 3 with 40 percent of the population 
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and its average family income is about 15 percent above the national average.  Alberta and 
British Columbia (ABC) are treated as one province with a 25 percent of the population and an 
average family income about two percent above the national average.  The remaining 
provinces, which we will refer to as the rest of Canada (ROC), have an average family income 
of 82 percent of the national average and 35 percent of the population.  (Quebec would 
represent approximately 70 percent of the population of ROC.)  Therefore, the model portrays 
a federation where the largest province is relatively rich, but where there is a large province 
that is relatively poor.  The third province has close to the national average income.  It is 
assumed that the ratio of the median to the mean income is 0.77 in all provinces, which was the 
approximate ratio of the median family income to the mean family income in most Canadian 
provinces in 2004.  It was also assumed that the income distribution in each of the three 
provinces followed a log normal distribution.  In the base case simulations, it is assumed that 
federal and provincial public services are “equally valuable” and that ρ = 8 and   = 8.  Finally, 
we have assumed for our based case calculation that η0 = -1.2 and ηi = -1.5 to reflect the 
greater tax sensitivity of the provincial tax bases compared to the federal tax base. 
φ
  The column (1) in Table 2 shows the values of the key endogenous variables using the 
base case parameters in the absence of transfers between the two levels of government, perhaps 
because of a constitutional prohibition against such transfers.  The federal tax rate would be 
14.9 percent and the provincial tax rates would range from 17.1 percent in province 1 (ROC) to 
12.4 percent in province 3 (ONT).  The tax price of government services at the median income 
level in jurisdiction j, TPj = (ymj/yaj)MCFj, would be 0.928 at the federal level, and 1.035, 
0.974, and 0.946 in provinces 1 to 3 respectively.  The tax prices for provincial services are 
higher than the federal tax price because we have assumed that the provincial tax bases are 
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more tax sensitive than the federal tax base.  The relatively high tax price in province 1 also 
reflects the fact that given its relatively low average income, it has to impose relatively high tax 
rates, which drives up its MCF.  In our model, these tax prices reflect the marginal benefit of 
public services for all individuals in each province.  Therefore, given these tax prices, all 
individuals in each province would feel that provincial public services were under-provided 
relative to federal services in the sense that the marginal benefit from an additional dollar spent 
on provincial services would exceed the marginal benefit from an additional dollar spent on 
federal public services.  There would be a vertical fiscal imbalance in the federation in the 
sense that there would be too much federal spending relative to provincial spending in all 
provinces.
7  We have adopted the following measure of the aggregate vertical fiscal imbalance, 




i i TP TP p VFI − ∑ =
=
           ( 2 0 )  
In the absence of federal transfers, the aggregate VFI would be 0.056, indicating that if federal 
services were reduced by $1 per capita and provincial services were increased by $1 per capita 
there would be a per capita welfare gain of $0.056. 
Column (2) shows the computed values of the key provincial and federal fiscal 
variables, including intergovernmental transfers, determined according to the median voter 
model described in the previous section.  The model predicts that the federal tax rate would 
increase to 16.9 percent from 14.9 percent in order to finance transfers to the provinces.  These 
transfers would represent 14.9 percent of total federal spending and finance between 18.1 
percent and 16.8 percent of provincial spending.  (These figures roughly correspond to the 
                                                 
7 There would also be a horizontal fiscal imbalance because the marginal benefit of public spending would not be 
equalized across provinces.  This issue is not addressed in this paper.  See Dahlby (2008b) for a more complete 
discussion of this way of defining fiscal imbalance. 
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relative size of total federal transfers to the Canadian provinces in recent years.)  Our aggregate 
measure of the vertical fiscal gap is  ∑ = 0 i i T / ) g p ( VFG or 0.173.  Provincial tax rates would 
decline and provincial spending on public services would increase.  The γis would range from 
0.302 in province 1 to 0.214 in province 3.  As a result of the shift of the tax burden to the 
federal level of government, the tax price of federal services would increase to 0.956 from 
0.928 and the tax prices of provincial public services would decline in all of the provinces.  
The aggregate index of VFI would decline to -0.011, indicating that in aggregate there would 
be slightly too much spending at the provincial level relative to spending on federal services.  
However, there would continue to be significant under-provision of provincial services in 
province 1 because the equal per capita lump-sum transfer would not address the horizontal 
fiscal imbalances among the provinces; i.e., the differences in their tax prices arising from 
differences in their per capita tax bases.   
The increase in provincial government services and the reduction in federal government 
service, combined with the federal tax increase and the provincial tax cut, will have different 
effects on the level of welfare of individuals in different provinces.  We have calculated the 
critical income levels,  , in each province at which an individual is no worse off as a result of 
the introduction of the intergovernmental transfers.  Individuals in province i with incomes 
below  are made better off with the introduction of transfers.   represents the 
percentage of the population of province i that is made better off as a result of the introduction 
of intergovernmental transfers.  In province 1 and province 2, everyone would be made better 
off with the introduction of transfers because their total tax rate would decline and they would 
benefit from the reduction in the VFI in the provision of provincial and federal public services.  
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of the intergovernmental transfers.  The beneficiaries in province 3 would be those with very 
low incomes.  Most individuals in province 3 will be worse off because their combined federal 
and provincial tax rate would increase by 0.2 percentage points, while the expansion in 
provincial services would be of less value to them, compared to individuals in other provinces, 
because they enjoyed a relatively high level of provincial services in the absence of the 
transfers.  These calculations indicate that the introduction of transfers could make high 
income individuals in the poor and (not so poor) provinces better off at the expense of poor 
people in the rich province.  See Usher (1995) for a discussion of the perverse redistribution 
that can occur through intergovernmental transfers. 
The transfers in column (2) would be regionally divisive, and this raises the question of 
whether the residents of province 3 would prefer to separate from the federation and form a 
separate country.
8  We can use our model to calculate the implications of separation for 
province 3 and whether a majority of individuals in province 3 would be better off with 
separation.  If province 3 formed a separate country, we assume that its tax base would still be 
relatively tax sensitive at η3 = -1.5.  It would have a larger, but more tax sensitive tax base, 
than the federal government in the “old” federation.  Because of this increased tax sensitivity, 
the MCF for an independent ONT would be relatively high, the optimal levels of g0 and g3 
would fall below the values in the old federation because the tax price of government services 
in an independent ONT would be 1.348.  As a result of the higher tax price and the consequent 
reduction in the provision of public services, and the higher average tax base, the total tax rate 
would decline by 7.5 percentage points.  The lower rate of taxation would increase private 
incomes by approximately 6.2 percent.  This combination of factors would leave some high 
income individuals better off if province 3 separated and other low income individuals would 
                                                 
8 See Bolton and Roland (1997) for an analysis of the economics of separation. 
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be worse off because the cut in public services would affect them more than the gains in their 
disposable incomes.  On balance our calculations show that 56.4 percent of the residents in 
province 3 would be better off if they separated from the federation if it imposes the transfers 
in column (2).  In the absence of intergovernmental grants, the percentage that would benefit 
from a separate state for province 3 would drop (marginally) to 55.7 percent.  Thus the 
intergovernmental grants would marginally exacerbate pressures for separation in province 3. 
Note that these calculations of the gains from separation assume that province 3 could 
provide the “federal” public service (say defence activity) at the same cost as in the old 
federation.  However, a smaller country might face high fixed costs and higher unit costs of 
providing the g0.  Our calculations show that if the unit cost of providing g0 were 10 percent 
higher in an independent ONT, then the percentage of its residents that would benefit from 
separation would drop from 53.3 percent to 41.2 percent.  These results indicate how important 
economies of scale in the provision of public services may be in binding countries together. 
  In column (3), we show how the tax sensitivity of the provincial tax base affects 
intergovernmental transfers.  In these calculations, ηi is set equal to -2.0 for all provinces 
instead of -1.50 as in the base case.  Not surprisingly there is a larger vertical fiscal imbalance 
in this scenario in the absence of intergovernmental grants, viz. VFI = 0.138.  With 
intergovernmental transfers, the federal tax rate is higher and the provincial tax rates are lower 
than with the base case scenario.  Transfers represent 22.9 percent of federal spending and 
between 28.4 and 30.8 percent of provincial spending and the average fiscal gap is 0.294.  As 
in the base case, the tax price of federal services increases and the tax prices of provincial 
services declines, and the aggregate vertical fiscal imbalance is virtually eliminated.  These 
transfers make all of the residents of provinces 1 and 2 better off and 96.6 percent of the 
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residents of province 3 are also better off.  Overall, 98.7 percent of the residents of the 
federation are better off with the level of intergovernmental grants determined by the median 
voter model than they would be in the absence of intergovernmental transfers.  Thus in contrast 
to the base case scenario in column (2), the existence of an intergovernmental grant system 
would not be a regionally divisive issue.  There would be differences of opinion regarding the 
level of transfers and there would still be horizontal fiscal imbalances, but virtually everyone 
would agree that intergovernmental transfers were an important part of fiscal architecture of 
the federation.  This scenario shows that if the provinces’ tax bases are much more tax 
sensitive than the federal tax base, then federal transfers to the provinces would be a very 
popular policy even in the rich province.  Only 35.1 percent of the residents of province 3 
would be better off it were an independent country.  However, if the federal government was 
prohibited from providing intergovernmental grants, 36.2 percent of the residents would be 
better off in an independent country.  Thus intergovernmental transfer would reduce 
(marginally) the support for separatism in province 3.  This scenario shows that 
intergovernmental grants can help bind a country together, in contrast to the scenario in column 
(2) where intergovernmental grants were divisive and promoted the break-up of the federation. 
  Column (4) shows the effect of an increase in intra-regional inequality.  The ratio of the 
median to mean income in this scenario is 0.70 compared to 0.77 in the base case scenario in 
column (2).  With the greater degree of inequality, the tax prices of federal and provincial 
government services for the voter with the median income are lower and the level of 
government expenditure is higher.  However, there is only a slightly greater emphasis on 
intergovernmental transfers, compared to the base case, and these transfers almost eliminate 
the aggregate VFI.  (In the absence of transfers, the VFI would be 0.058, only slightly higher 
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than the 0.056 value recorded in the base case.)  A slightly higher percentage of the population 
in province 3 benefits from intergovernmental grants, but 54 percent of the population in 
province 3 would still benefit from separation if g0 could be provided at the same unit cost.  
These computations seem to indicate that the nature of the political equilibrium and the relative 
provision of intergovernmental grants is not greatly affected by an increase in the degree of 
income inequality within all regions.  The ratio of the median to mean income has declined in 
all the Canadian provinces over the last 25 years, reflecting a more unequal income 
distribution.  However, our model predicts that this trend would not greatly affect the reliance 
on intergovernmental grants because it would have similar effects on the demand for both 
federal and provincial public services and therefore would not greatly affect the vertical fiscal 
imbalance in the federation. 
  Column (5) illustrates the effect of greater inter-regional inequality.  In this scenario, 
the average income in province 3 is increased by 5.0 percent and the average income in 
province one is reduced by 8 percent so that average national income (in the absence of tax 
changes) would remain the same.  In this scenario, the federal tax rate is lower and federal 
transfers are a smaller percentage of total federal spending than in the base case scenario.  The 
aggregate VFI is reduced from 0.069 in the absence of transfers to 0.018.  Given the greater 
degree of regional inequality, it is not surprising that transfers make virtually everyone in 
provinces 1 and 2 better off and virtually everyone in province 3 worse off.  The percentage of 
the population of province 3 that would be better off in a separate country would increase to 
65.9 percent, and the existence of transfers only boosts this by 0.7 percentage point.  Overall, 
the somewhat surprising lesson from these computations is that greater inter-regional 
inequality does not necessarily result in greater reliance on inter-governmental grants. 
   24
The scenario in column (6) shows that reliance on intergovernmental grants would 
increase substantially if provincial services were much more highly valued than federal 
services.  In this scenario, ρ = 12 and φ = 4.  The relatively high valuation of provincial 
services is meant to reflect, in a rough and ready way, the constitutional division of spending 
responsibilities in Canada where the provinces have “exclusive” jurisdiction over health, 
education and welfare.  These are the big ticket items for most governments in modern 
countries, and the provincial-local government sector in Canada is responsible for 60 percent 
of government program spending in Canada.  The calculations show that the federal grants to 
the provinces would increase to 57 percent of total federal spending and represent between 
45.6 and 43.7 percent of provincial spending, with an average fiscal gap of 0.440.  This level of 
transfers would eliminate the aggregate VFI which would be substantial in the absence of fiscal 
transfers—VFI = 0.245.  The provision of transfers would make over 99.9 percent of the 
population in the poor province better off, but only improve the well-being of 60.5 percent of 
residents of province 2 because the residents of that province would face a two percentage 
point tax increase (compared to the no transfer case).  In province 3, 23.3 percent of the 
population would be better off with the transfers from the federal government, but 57.5 percent 
of the population would be better off with a separate province.  Transfer would boost the 
percentage that would benefit from separation from 52.9 to 57.5 percent.  The conclusion that 
we draw from these calculations is that a strong preference for provincial public services 
compared to federal public services could result in a very large fiscal vertical fiscal imbalance 
in the absence of transfers. A majority of voters might desire relatively large transfers—
creating a very large fiscal gap—in order to address this problem.  However, these transfers 
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might strengthen support for separatism in a rich province because it would be better able to 
provide these more valuable provincial services on its own. 
 
4.0  Intergovernmental Transfers with a Bicameral Federal Legislature 
  The previous model assumed that the federal legislature was unicameral with the 
geographic representation in the House based on population.  However, some federations, such 
as the United States and Australia, have bicameral federal legislatures, where equal numbers of 
representatives are elected to an upper house, or Senate, from each subnational government, 
resulting in greater per capita representation by small subnational governments.
9  We will now 
assume that the Senate and the House jointly determine the federal government’s fiscal policy, 
and that there are an equal number of senators from each province.  Each senator’s desired 
fiscal policy will reflect the median voter’s preference in his state, i.e. the preferences of the 
individual with the median income in his province.  Substituting ymi for yh in (10) and in (12b), 
the Senator for province i would want the t0, g0, and T0 to be determined by the federal budget 
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Note that (22) is equivalent to (12b), the tax rate that would be preferred if voters thought that 
an additional dollar of grant would be used for tax cuts.  It is reasonable to assume that 
                                                 
9 Atlas et al. (1995) in a study of the pattern of U.S. federal spending 1972-1990 found that states with greater per 
capita representation in the Senate and House received higher per capita federal spending.  Porto and Sanguinetti 
(2001) found that the provinces in Argentina that were over-represented in the senate and the lower house 
received more resources per capita from the central government than other provinces. See also Stegarescu (no 
date) for a detailed empirical study of the characteristics of upper chambers and their impact on fiscal decisions in 
federations. 
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provinces with low average incomes will also tend to have high MCFs because these provinces 
will generally have apply higher tax rates to finance provincial public services and therefore 
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The Senator from a province with a low yai/MCFi ratio would want a higher federal tax rate for 
two reasons.  First the federal tax price of funds will be lower compared to the provincial tax 
price if the average income in the province is lower.  Second, the marginal benefit from the 
transfers financed by a higher federal tax rate will be of more value when the provincial MCF 
is high.  Consequently, the federal tax rates desired by the senator from province i, t0i, will be 
ranked as t01 > t02 > t03 > …> t0n.  In the Senate, the median desired federal tax rate will be the 
tax rate desired by the Senator from the province with the median provincial average income, 
.  It is also reasonable to assume (if the intra-regional inequality does not vary a great deal 
from province to province) that this province will have the median provincial median income, 
 and it will prefer the median desired level value for g0.  Consequently, our model assumes 








































t         ( 2 5 )  
It should be clear that the tax, expenditure, and transfers policy that would be supported by the 
Senate might be quite different from the tax, expenditure, and transfers policy that would be 
supported in the House and that the federal government’s policy might be a compromise 
between the desired fiscal policies of the House and the Senate.  The modelling the 
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compromise or bargain between the two houses is beyond the scope of this paper.  Here we 
will simply note that the Senate will tend to support higher federal taxes (and presumably 
higher level of federal transfers) if the federation has a relative large number of low average 
income provinces.  Therefore, we would expect that in a federation where the Senate has some 
influence over the federal budget, the level of federal taxation and federal transfers to the 
provinces will be higher if the federation has a relatively large number of poor provinces, i.e., 
where the  ratio is low. 0 a
med
ai y / y
10 
Would a Senator from an above average income province ever support positive 
transfers from the federal government even though an additional dollar of federal transfers 
might “cost” the average taxpayer in his province more than a dollar?  If we substitute (25) into 
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The right-hand side of (27) could be greater than one if a province’s marginal cost of public 
funds is high, and the tax sensitivity of the federal tax base and the value of federal services are 
relatively low.  Therefore, it is possible for a province with an above average income to desire 
a positive level of transfers from the federal government even though, as in the case of Ontario, 
an additional dollar of federal transfers might “cost” the average Ontario taxpayer $1.15. 
  To gain some appreciate of the effect that a bicameral federal legislature might have on 
the vertical fiscal gap in a federation, we have calculated the political equilibria using the same 
parameter values as in the base case in Table 2.  The column in Table 3 labelled House Control 
                                                 
10 See Pereira (1996) for a formal model of the effects of “one mayor one vote” on the pattern of 
intergovernmental grants in Portugal. 
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is the same as column (2) in Table 2.  It is repeated here to ease comparisons.  The column 
labelled Bicameral Compromise represents the values of the fiscal variables if the House and 
the Senate agreed to split the difference between their desired tax and expenditure rates.  Note 
that in these scenarios, the Senate’s fiscal policy is based on the policy desired by the Senator 
from province 2 (ABC) and that province’s average income is close to the national average in 
these simulations.  In spite of this, the compromise solution would involve substantially higher 
federal transfers, and the VFG would 0.336 compared to 0.176 if the House controlled the 
federal fiscal policy.  The column labelled Senate Control represents the fiscal policies that 
would prevail if the Senate determined the federal government’s fiscal policies.  In this 
scenario, the VFG would be 0.504.  Note that with Senate Control, a significant negative fiscal 
imbalance could emerge as a result of the large transfers to the provinces.  In summary, these 
calculations indicate that a bicameral federal legislature, where the Senate has some influence 
over fiscal policies, could result in substantially higher intergovernmental transfers even 
though the median average provincial income is close to the average national income. 
 
5.0  The Vertical Fiscal Gaps in Australia and Canada 
We introduced our paper with the observation that there are substantial variations in the 
vertical fiscal gaps across federations, and we highlighted the large difference in the vertical 
fiscal gaps in Australia and Canada.  Does our model help to explain the differences between 
these two federations?   
Three factors are largely responsible for the differences in the fiscal gaps in Australia 
and Canada—the “Quebec factor”, differences in regional representation in the federal 
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parliaments, and differences in the effective tax powers exercised by the Australian states and 
the Canadian provinces.  We consider each of these factors below. 
The province of Quebec has played a crucial role in asserting provincial powers in 
taxation and spending and resisting federal encroachment in areas of “exclusive” provincial 
jurisdiction through the provision of federal grants.
11  No state government in Australia has 
insisted on its need for fiscal independence in order to promote its cultural and linguistic 
independence to anywhere near the same degree.  The Quebec factor is obviously something 
that is “outside” our model, and to a certain degree it has influenced the other factors, regional 
representation in Ottawa and the tax powers of the provinces, which play key roles in our 
model. 
There are significant differences in the regional representation in the federal 
parliaments which may have influenced the size of the vertical fiscal gap in the two countries.  
Australia has a bicameral federal legislature.  Each of the six states has 12 elected Senators, 
while the Northern Territory (NT) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) each have two.  
Although the federal parliament in Canada has a Senate, it has little effective power because its 
members are appointed by the Prime Minister.  Consequently, the Senators do not have the 
moral authority, under most circumstances, to overturn legislation that has been passed in the 
House of Commons.  This makes the Canadian federal parliament effectively unicameral. 
The lack of effective regional representation in the Canadian federal parliament is one 
of the factors that has enhanced the role of the provincial governments in championing 
provincial concerns.  This political process, involving negotiations and consultation between 
the federal and provincial governments, has become known as executive federalism.  The level 
of intergovernmental grants is frequently discussed at these federal-provincial conferences.  In 
                                                 
11 See Telford (2003) on Quebec’s opposition to the use of the federal spending power in Canada. 
   30
some sense, the leaders of the provincial governments, the Premiers, have taken on the roles 
that are fulfilled by Senators in other federations.  However, the Premiers have no 
constitutional powers with regard to the setting of intergovernmental grants, and therefore it is 
unclear whether the provinces, individually or collectively, have an influence on this aspect of 
federal policy.   
Has the existence of a bicameral parliament in Australia affected the level of transfers 
to the states compared to Canada which effectively has a unicameral federal parliament?  Our 
model predicts that transfers to subnational governments will be larger if the national 
parliament is bicameral with equal representation from each state and if there are a relatively 
large number of low income states.  In particular, if the median average state income is below 
the national average income, the median Senator will favour higher transfers to the states than 
the median Representative in the House. 
Figure 2 shows the average taxable income in each state in Australia in 2003.  
Tasmania had the lowest average taxable income, $35,477 and the ACT had the highest, 
$45,985.  The national average taxable income was $40,825.  The three states with average 
incomes significantly below the national average—Tasmania, Queensland, and South 
Australia—had a combined total of 36 senate seats, and our model would predict that the 
Senators from these states would support relatively high transfers to the state governments.  
Two states, Western Australia and Victoria, had average taxable incomes slightly below the 
national average.  In total, 60 Senators came from states that had average incomes below the 
national average.  In contrast, only New South Wales, the Northern Territory and the ACT had 
average incomes that are above the national average, and they had a combined total of 16 
Senators.  As Figure 3 indicates, the cumulative distribution of Senate seats, ordered by 
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average state income, is much more pro-poor than the distribution of the population, also 
suggesting that the upper house would favour higher transfers than a lower house elected on 
the basis of population.  In summary, the overwhelming major of Senators come from states 
that have average incomes that are below the national average, and our model would predict 
that the existence of a senate in Australia has increased the level of transfers relative to 
country, such as Canada, with a unicameral federal parliament. 
While the vast majority of Senators in Australia come from states with below average 
incomes, our model also suggests that the crucial votes will be by Senators from the state with 
the median average state income, and that the pressure for high transfers will be larger when 
the ratio of the median average state income to the national average income is low.  Western 
Australia has the “quasi median” average state income, in the sense that 36 Senators come 
from states with lower average incomes and 28 Senators come from states with higher average 
incomes.  However, Western Australia’s average taxable income, $40,187, was 98.4 percent of 
the national average in 2003, and therefore the incentives for Western Australian Senators to 
raise transfers to the states in order to redistribute income to their residents is not very strong.   
  In summary, the existence of an upper chamber in Australia, with a large majority of 
senators from relatively poor states, would be expected to increase the size of the vertical fiscal 
gap relative to Canada, but the median average state income is close to the national average, 
which would diminish the importance of the bicameral federal legislature for determining the 
size of the vertical fiscal gap in Australia. 
  The third factor that has undoubtedly contributed to the larger fiscal gap in Australia is 
that the states have more limited effective tax powers than Canadian provinces.  Both the 
Canadian provinces and the Australian states are limited to “direct taxes”, but judicial 
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interpretations of this illusive concept resulted in rulings that prohibited state sales taxes in 
Australia but permitted provincial sales in Canada.  The inability to levy sales taxes has 
severely restricted the revenue raising capacity of the Australian states.  Furthermore, the 
Australian states do not levy personal or corporate income taxes while these taxes are 
important sources of own-source revenue for the provincial governments in Canada.  The 
absence of state income taxes in Australia can be traced to the centralization of taxation that 
occurred in World War II, when the Commonwealth government took control of these fields in 
order to finance the war effort.  After the war, the Commonwealth government retained its 
exclusive control over these tax fields because the state governments were reluctant to re-enter 
these fields by imposing their own tax rates.  In Canada, similar policies were adopted to 
finance the war effort, and the federal government took control of the personal and corporate 
income tax fields.  However, after the war there was strong pressure by Quebec and Ontario to 
levy their own income taxes, and the provinces re-entered these tax fields.  The upshot of this 
political and fiscal history is that the Australian states do not levy sales and income taxes while 
the Canadian provinces do. As a result, the state governments in Australia are effectively 
limited to relatively distortionary forms of taxes,
12 such as excise taxes, and therefore the 
MCFs of the state governments would be very much higher than the Commonwealth 
government’s MCF in the absence of a large fiscal gap. 
  In summary, while the Quebec factor has undoubtedly played a key role in giving 
provincial governments greater effective tax powers in Canada than the states exercise in 
Australia, the absence of an effective upper house in Canada and the willingness to exercise of 
                                                 
12 By this we mean that if the Australian states were to raise similar amounts of revenue to the Canadian provinces 
they would have to levy very high tax rates on their limited tax bases and these high tax rates would be very 
distortionary. 
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those tax powers by all of the Canadian provinces have likely reduced the size of the vertical 
fiscal gap in Canada compared to Australia. 
 
6.0  Conclusion 
Our model attempts to explain how the electoral process, tax assignment, and 
expenditure assignment in a federation may affect the size of the vertical fiscal gap.  It provides 
some insights to the questions that we posed in the introductory section. 
How does the allocation of spending powers and the tax assignment in a federation affect the 
size of the fiscal gap? 
Our model predicts that the fiscal gap will be larger the greater tax sensitivity of the provincial 
tax bases compare to the federal tax base and the greater the relative importance of 
provincially-provided public services compared to federal services.  If the provinces’ tax bases 
are highly mobile or if they are responsible for important public expenditures, such as health, 
education and welfare, then the fiscal gap will be larger. 
Does income inequality, between provinces and within provinces, affect the size of the fiscal 
gap? 
The fiscal gap might be larger the greater the degree of regional income inequality, as 
measured by differences in average incomes by province, but this is not always the case. 
Intra-provincial income inequality seems to have little effect on the size of the fiscal gap. 
Does a fiscal gap improve or distort the allocation of resources in an economy? 
A fiscal gap can improve the allocation of public sector spending and taxation when the 
provincial tax bases are much more tax sensitive than federal tax bases and when provinces 
provide important public services.  However, a very large fiscal gap, resulting in “excessive” 
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provincial spending, could be generated by a democratic process especially if there are many 
poorer provinces that have strong representation in the central government through an upper 
house. 
Who gains and who loses from federal transfers to subnational governments? 
Individuals in low average income provinces tend to gain at the expense of individuals in high 
income provinces.  Intergovernmental transfers can redistribute income from poor individuals 
in rich provinces to rich individuals in poor provinces. However, if the provincial tax bases are 
highly tax sensitive, almost everyone in the federation, including the most of the residents of 
rich provinces, can be made better off through federal transfers to the provinces. 
Do intergovernmental transfers promote national unity or exacerbate regional tensions? 
Intergovernmental grants can promote national unity if the tax sensitivity of the provincial tax 
bases is relatively high because the federation serves as a “tax cartel”.  Intergovernmental 
grants can exacerbate regional tensions if the differences in average provincial incomes are 
large, leading to the “fiscal exploitation” of rich provinces. 
Does size of the fiscal gap depend on whether the federal legislature is unicameral or 
bicameral? 
A bicameral federal legislature, where each province in the upper house has the same number 
of representatives, will tend to provide higher intergovernmental transfers than a unicameral 
legislature if the median average provincial income is low compared to the national average 
income.  That is, if there are a large number of relatively poor provinces.  Executive 
federalism, as practiced in Canada, has an unknown effect on federal transfers, but the 
influence of the provincial governments may be felt through the demand for transfers express 
by the “pivotal province”.  Our analysis indicates that British Columbia has played this role 
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during most of the last 25 years, but changes in real per capita (non-equalization) transfers are 
not closely linked to changes in the relative tax prices of provincial and federal services in BC. 
Does the magnitude of stimulative effect of transfers on a jurisdiction’s spending influence the 
level of transfers? 
Our model predicts that the stimulative effect of transfers on spending will be larger in 
provinces with lower average incomes.  A larger stimulative effect generally means that 
intergovernmental transfers provide relative greater benefits to lower income individuals. 
However, it has an ambiguous effect on the desired transfer by the median voter in a province.  
Why would the representatives of relative rich provinces support at least some level of 
intergovernmental transfers from the central government? 
The representatives from a province with an average income above the national average might 
desire positive transfers from the federal government if the province’s marginal cost of public 
funds is high, the tax sensitivity of the federal tax base is relatively low, and the marginal 
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Table 1  Transfers as a Percentage of Regional Government Spending 
Country  1970 1980 1990 1998 
Australia  46.4 53.3 44.6 40.7 
Austria  33.0 34.7 36.1 46.5 
Belgium   51.0  53.5  53.7 
Canada  23.7 19.5 16.4 13.8 
Germany  15.3 16.1 15.0 17.3 
Spain   97.5  67.4  65.8 
Switzerland  28.5 26.9 19.2 30.7 
United  States  27.7 26.4 21.1 25.0 
Source: Bird and Tarasov (2004, Table 3, p.91) 
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Table 2  Calculation of the Vertical Fiscal Gap with a Unicameral Federal Legislature 
Column 
Number 




































            
t0  0.149 0.169 0.191 0.190 0.165  0.168 
t1  0.171 0.145 0.124 0.161 0.163  0.144 
t2  0.140 0.119 0.104 0.133 0.124  0.121 
t3  0.124 0.106 0.093 0.119 0.106  0.110 
T0/(T0 + g0) -- 0.149  0.229  0.154  0.115  0.571 
T0/g1  -- 0.181  0.308  0.187  0.140  0.456 
T0/g2  -- 0.172  0.292  0.177  0.130  0.437 
T0/g3  -- 0.168  0.284  0.173  0.126  0.428 
VFG --  0.173  0.294  0.178  0.132  0.440 
γ1  -- 0.302  0.389  0.340  0.333  0.393 
γ2  -- 0.243  0.319  0.274  0.245  0.326 
γ3  -- 0.214  0.283  0.242  0.205  0.292 
TP0  0.928 0.956 0.988 0.897 0.942  0.955 
TP1  1.035 0.984 1.025 0.923 1.019  0.982 
TP2  0.974 0.938 0.972 0.874 0.947  0.941 
TP3  0.946 0.916 0.947 0.852 0.916  0.922 
VFI 0.056  -0.011  -0.008  -0.014  0.018  -0.007 
) y ( H
*
1 1   -- 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.999 
) y ( H
*
2 2   -- 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.605 
) y ( H
*
3 3   -- 0.015  0.966  0.053  0.000  0.233 
*
0 H   -- 0.606  0.987  0.621  0.600  0.594 
         
Notes: 
ap1 = 0.35, p2 = 0.25, p3 = 0.40; ymi/yai = 0.77, ρ = 8, φ = 8, η0 = -1.2, ηi = -1.5, ya1/ya0 = 
0.82, ya2/ya0 = 1.016, ya3/ya0 = 1.148 (relative average incomes in the absence of taxation) 
bηi = -2.0  i = 1, 2, 3 
c ymi/yai = 0.70 
d ya1/ya0 = 0.754, ya2/ya0 = 1.016, ya3/ya0 = 1.205 (relative average incomes in the absence of 
taxation) 
eρ = 12, φ = 4 
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Table 3  Fiscal Outcomes with a Bicameral Federal Legislature 
 
 
House Control  House and Senate 
Compromise 
Senate Control 
t0  0.169 0.187  0.207 
t1  0.145 0.119  0.091 
t2  0.119 0.098  0.076 
t3  0.106 0.088  0.068 
T0/(T0 + g0) 0.149  0.270  0.376 
T0/g1  0.181 0.347  0.515 
T0/g2  0.172 0.334  0.502 
T0/g3  0.168 0.329  0.496 
VFG 0.173  0.336  0.504 
γ1  0.302 0.289  0.275 
γ2  0.243 0.234  0.225 
γ3  0.214 0.208  0.201 
TP0  0.956 0.920  0.884 
TP1  0.984 0.937  0.892 
TP2  0.938 0.903  0.869 
TP3  0.916 0.887  0.858 
VFI -0.011  -0.074  -0.142 
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Figure 1 








































The Distribution of Population and Senate Seats by State 















Cumulative Population Cumulative Senate Seats  
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, National Regional Profile, 2000 to 2004 
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